Blog> Strategic Security> A closer look at the construction of China’s missile silos
Authors: Matt Korda and Hans Kristensen • November 2, 2021
[Update: Since Maxar does not allow their satellite images to be superimposed on competitors' images, some images have been temporarily deleted. ] After the discovery of at least three huge missile silos under construction near Yumen in the summer, in Hami and Ordos in north-central China, new commercial satellite images show these three locations as well as the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) Significant progress has been made at the training site near Kelan Terrace.
These images vividly and rarely show the public a top-secret and highly sensitive architectural project. The Chinese government has not formally confirmed or denied that the facility under construction is a missile silo, and there are many uncertainties and unknowns about the nature and function of the facility. In this article, we use words such as suspicious, obvious, and possible to remind readers of this fact.
However, our analysis of hundreds of satellite images of suspicious missile silos and different facilities under construction in each silo in the past three years has increased our confidence that they are indeed related to the PLA Air Force’s modernization plan. In the recent analysis of new satellite images obtained from Planet Labs and Maxar Technologies, we have observed that the construction of suspected silos is progressing almost every week, and we have discovered that it seems to be designed to support missile operations after the silo sites are put into use. Unique facilities.
In this article, we describe the progress we have observed. We first describe the shelter, then what we saw under the shelter, the unique support facilities, and finally end with a holistic observation.
In every possible missile silo site newly discovered in China, some of the most obvious features are the environmental shelters covering the head of each suspected silo. It was the first sight of these structures at Gilan Terrace that led to the discovery of three large suspected missile silos. The refuge is not a new phenomenon in the construction of Chinese missiles; the declassified report of the National Center for Photographic Interpretation of the United States shows that in the 1970s and 1980s, China used a mixture of “large rectangular covers”, “camouflage nets” and other types of bunkers to protect them. The silo is protected from natural disasters and spies. The satellite above.
The construction schedule is usually like this: the head of each silo is cleaned, and then shelters are built before the large-scale excavation begins. Sometimes, before installing the silo components, the silo hole (or part of it) will be excavated, and then a shelter will be erected on it. Several satellite images show a semi-circular structure, which can be put into a hole and assembled into a silo wall at this stage. A few months later, the shelter was demolished and construction continued in the open, with the auxiliary structure being less sensitive.
In addition to hiding the details of the silo from the satellite, these environmental shelters also play an important role in the construction process: the winter temperature in the Jilantai training area and other areas can reach below -25 degrees Celsius, and pouring concrete at cold temperatures will cause it to freeze And cracking. In addition, many suspected silo locations in China are located in desert areas with periodic sandstorms. Spring flooding is another challenge, so many silo sites and roads are elevated above the ground, and barriers or tunnels are usually installed to prevent water damage. Therefore, environmental shelters contribute to smooth and planned construction throughout the year, and they can be built and dismantled in just a few days.
Interestingly, China seems to be experimenting with several different types of shelters for each suspected silo. The reason may be related to the actual construction problems, rather than the things built under them.
Among the suspicious silo complexes in China, the most common shelter is a rectangular dome-like structure, very similar to shelters used in indoor tennis courts or football fields. Each structure appears to be inflated, with an estimated area of 4,125 square meters, and must be accessed through a series of airlocks-one for pedestrians and the other for vehicles. The external ventilation system provides climate control and a slight continuous overpressure inside the dome, keeping it circular. See the example of an inflatable shelter.
The same rectangular air dome can be seen in the Jilantai missile training area, the suspected Yumen silo, and the suspected Hami silo. Although this does not necessarily prove that the same construction is underway under each dome, it does imply a connection between the activities of the three locations.
In July 2021, Capella Space, a satellite company specializing in synthetic aperture radar, imaged a dome at the Yumen site. The SAR image allows the analyst to see the outline of some structures under the dome, although it is difficult to discern many things from the image except for the clearly visible outer airlock frame. There seems to be obvious activity in the center of the dome, which is the location of the suspected silo hole.
At the suspicious Hami Silo Yard, we saw a slightly longer variant of the common dome shelter deployed. The Hami site is at a later stage of development than the Yumen site. These structures are about 20 meters longer than the above-mentioned domes erected at Yumen and Jilantai, but appear to be very similar in other respects. An obvious difference between the two is that the vehicle air brake does not extend beyond the main structure of the dome, but is embedded in the dome itself (see the picture below).
Although the suspected silo site in Hami contains two types of inflatable domes, there are now more longer versions than shorter ones. Given that Hami is a newer site than Yumen and Jilantai, the building may now have completely moved to a longer version and will continue to use this structure in future sites. Although the Yumen site does not seem to have any longer domes, it is worth noting that some rough extensions to its shorter domes were erected there. This adds about 20 meters and expands the short dome to the size of the new longer dome (see image below).
The reason for the construction of the longer domed shelter may indicate that the silo excavation and construction activities require more space than PLARF initially thought, and they must now adapt to the new site. The estimated area of the longer dome is 4,925 square meters, excluding the approximately 300 square meters required for embedded vehicle airlocks; this makes the total area slightly smaller than the area of the NFL football field, which is approximately 5,350 square meters.
A different type of inflatable dome is being deployed at the third suspected missile silo site near Ordos. Instead of using shorter and longer rectangular domes, PLARF chose to use a round dome with a circular base. Interestingly, these circular domes seem to have several different types of patterns (see picture below).
Except for the difference in shape and pattern, the function of the dome seems to be the same as other locations. Similar to the longer rectangular air hood, the vehicle air brake appears to be embedded in the dome.
Compared with the rectangular domes used in Yumen, Hami and Jilantai, these circular domes have some potential advantages. The circle is stronger than the rectangle and provides the largest internal space with the least surface area. This means less fabric is needed to create the structure, which saves potential costs. The estimated area of the circular dome is approximately 4,725 square meters, excluding the 300 square meters required for embedded vehicle airlocks.
PLARF also built a solid rectangular structure to temporarily cover some suspected missile silos. In 2018, Catherine Dill pointed out that before demolition in December 2017, a sturdy 32m x 66m gable roof structure covered a silo in Wuzhai. In 2019, Hans Kristensen discovered the Guilantai missile training area, which included a sturdy structure with similar measurements covering a newly built silo; in total, the first four of the Guilantai’s obvious The silo was built under a strong shelter. In 2020, Scott LaFoy and Decker Eveleth also noticed the existence of four high-bay structures with similar measurements, covering the DF-4 intercontinental ballistic missile launch site previously identified at Sundian.
In addition to these locations, 11 identical physical structures were constructed at locations suspected to be Yumen missile silos (see picture below). These structures-one of the first structures built in Yumen between March and October 2020-were outliers of the entire complex, which was subsequently completely filled with shorter dome shelters , These shelters will be deployed later in the building complex (see picture below).
What is under the shelter?
Several shelters on the suspected silo construction site have now been demolished, which allows us to better determine the possible functions of the site. The features shown in the new satellite images once again confirm that these sites appear to be silos at different stages of construction. Some satellite images taken at the site prior to the construction of the shelter have shown features strongly suggesting that these sites are missile silos, while the first four sites of Jilan Station are obviously silos. However, as more and more shelters have been demolished, so far there have been more than 40, and our assessment shows that the evidence for silo construction is getting stronger.
Since the construction of the silos of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force Base near Jilantai started before the construction of three large missile silos, the development of Jilantai is likely to be a precursor to events that will occur at other locations later. One of the first four silos (39.76470°N, 105.53952°E) seems to show silo operation. Preparations for the site began in July 2019. By early August, satellite images showed that a 6-meter-wide deep hole was dug in a 14-15 meter shallow hole. The following month, a shelter was built on the silo, apparently to hide the technical details of the satellite. This is a sturdy shelter, similar to the first 11 later built in Yumen. After the construction of the silo was completed, the shelter was demolished, while the construction of access and command and control facilities continued. This summer, Maxar satellite photos showed what appeared to be a missile loading operation at the scene, and on October 29, Planet Labs satellites captured additional crane operations over open silos (see below). The silo may not be in use yet.
The first four silos at Kelan Terrace are covered by shelters similar to garages. But in early 2021, dome-shaped bunkers were erected on another 10 possible missile silos. These domes or inflatable shelters are the same or similar to the shelters on most suspected silo sites in Hami, Yomi, and Ordos. In late October, the dome of Gilan Terrace began to collapse. One of the satellite images (39.72593°N, 105.52898°E) showed clear signs of possible silos, first in the early stages before the shelter was built, and finally after the shelter was dismantled. Visible features include what appears to be silo hatches, small auxiliary buildings, and ground markings for command and control cables or power lines that may be buried in the ground (see image below). The other stations in Kelan Terrace have the same characteristics and dimensions.
In Yumen, which started construction earlier than Hami and Ordos, the characteristics of the silo are also clearly visible. So far, at least 29 shelters that appear to be silos in Yumen have been demolished. The structures are very similar: a silo hatch clearly located on an elevated mound, with small auxiliary structures, and a large turning channel that might be used by missile transport and maintenance trucks. An obvious silo site under construction in Yumen is shown below. In the next few months, the remaining surface features will be completed.
The operation of a large missile silo site requires extensive support infrastructure. This includes main base headquarters, technical support bases, missile and warhead support facilities, command and control infrastructure, power supply and roads. At the three suspected missile silo sites in Hami, Yumen, and Ordos, and the training ground near Jilantai, many of the facilities under construction appear to support these functions.
One of the most unique facilities under construction is a large complex, which includes what appears to be three large parallel pipes embedded in trenches and connected to the building by smaller pipes. The underground tunnel connects the three pipes and may eventually be covered by soil. So far, this type of facility has been discovered in Hami and Ordos missile silos (see the picture below), but has not yet been discovered in Yumen. The functions of these two facilities are unknown, but may be related to the climate control storage or processing of fragile missiles and/or warhead components or the command bunker function. (Note: There is no evidence that this is indeed the case.)
Another unique facility seen so far only in Hami (42.2343°N, 92.897°E) includes a central complex of growing mountains surrounded by four tunnels that appear to lead to underground facilities. The tunnel is still under construction, showing a large amount of excavated soil dumped nearby (see picture below). The function of the facility is unknown, but may involve the storage and management of missiles and/or warheads. Similarly, there is no evidence that this is indeed the case, and it is only speculation at the moment. The base tunnel complex appears to be connected to the main missile silo grid by underground cables. Sixty kilometers (37 miles) west (42.32163° north latitude, 92.16282° east longitude), on the other side of the suspected missile field, is a similar facility and a tunnel is being constructed.
There are many other structures under construction that may be technical service facilities and launch control centers. Especially in Hami, we have seen the construction of long power lines to provide electricity for huge facilities. Finally, some construction camps and soil extraction sites of various sizes can be seen at all suspected missile launch sites.
To help monitor and explain the construction of suspected missile silos in China, the Federation of American Scientists has produced interactive maps for each suspected missile silo in Yumen, Hami, and Ordos (see the example of Yumen below). Each map has a slider that allows viewers to see how the construction of major facilities has progressed over time. These maps will be updated as the construction continues. To access the map, please use the following link:
The similarities between the structure and construction activities of the Jilantai training area and the three suspected missile silos under construction near Yuman, Hami, and Ordos all indicate that this seems to be clearly related to the PLA’s missile program. In the early days, this connection was most obvious at Gilan Station, where commercial satellite images captured semi-circular silo wall structures, silo hatches, and even potential missile loading operations. As described in this article, as the construction of large-scale missile launch sites in Yumen, Hami, and Ordos progresses, we see strong signs in satellite images that seem to be building missile launch silos and supporting facilities.
It is worth noting that no other inflatable dome complex of this size has been found in other locations in China. Some sites (for example: 40.18064° N, 107.53670° E) seem to have similar (but shorter) interval patterns to those seen in a suspected silo field; however, at higher image resolutions, these structures are obvious Not a dome refuge or a silo, but actually a smaller and very different structure of a windmill. It is possible to build some windmills between the obvious silos; there is some evidence in Yumen. We noticed that some US intercontinental ballistic missile silos are also close to windmills (for example: 40.8222, -104.0505); this does not seem to interfere with silo operations, but it will affect helicopter operations in the area.
Although we increasingly believe that the facilities we describe are related to PLARF’s missile program, it is also important to proceed with caution and avoid confirmation bias—especially if there are other relevant sites that have not yet been spotted on commercial satellite imagery. We also don’t know China. Plan what to load in the obvious missile silo, or how much it will be armed in the end. The Chinese government has not officially confirmed or denied that these facilities are missile silos. But US military officials seem to have confirmed that the reported missile silos are part of China’s nuclear modernization program. Based on the features that we can check on new satellite images, we are increasingly convinced that these facilities are indeed missile silos and support facilities under construction.
For China, this is an unprecedented nuclear construction. We and others have said that this raises questions and uncertainties about China's minimum nuclear deterrence and policies. On the other hand, even the construction of a large number of silos does not necessarily reflect a change in the basic role of the Chinese leadership to give its nuclear power. For example, China may still retain its no-first-use policy. The obvious missile silos are still many years away from being fully operational, and it remains to be seen how China will arm and operate them.
Importantly, the buildup will not further increase nuclear competition and contribute to the worst-case scenario of other nuclear-weapon states, although we are concerned that these are possible outcomes. These developments will occupy a prominent place in the ongoing nuclear posture assessment of the Biden administration. We urge the government not to overreact, but to engage in dialogue with the Chinese government to formulate measures to ease tensions and increase transparency.
The reason is obvious: Although China has so far refused to limit its nuclear power and believes that “the countries with the largest nuclear arsenals [Russia and the United States] have special and primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament”, the scale of China’s missile silos—combined Other elements of China's nuclear modernization-China can be included in this category in the near future. Approximately 300 obvious silos are under construction-this number exceeds the number of intercontinental ballistic missile silos operated by Russia-and more than 100 road-mobile ICBM launchers. China's total ICBM strength is It may surpass Russia and the United States. foreseeable future.
Ironically, this worrying development may also create new opportunities for arms control discussions and potential agreements. That is, if there is the political will to pursue them. As the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference approaches early next year, this seems to be a good time for nuclear powers to show their will.
This publication was generously supported by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the New Land Foundation, the Ploughshare Foundation, and the Prospect Mountain Foundation. The statements made and opinions expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.
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